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CRAIG ON THE GROUNDING OBJECTION TO
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
Scott A. Davison

Recently William L. Craig has argued that the so-called "Grounding
Objection" against Molinist theories of providence can be answered. I show
that despite Craig's clever arguments to the contrary, the Grounding Objection
has not been answered, so it still represents a serious obstacle to the acceptance of Molinism.

According to Luis de Molina's theory of providence ("Molinism"'), logically prior to the creation of the world, God knew what people would freely
choose to do if placed in certain situations, and this knowledge guided
God's choices about what to create. (If we follow St. Augustine in thinking
that God created time itself, then we cannot talk about what happened
before creation in a temporal sense of before'; but we can still talk about
the logical sense of 'before', which refers to the order of explanation,
instead of the order of time.) In other words, Molina's theory implies that
God knew many propositions of the following form: "If creature S were
placed in circumstances C, then S would freely perform action A."
Following a somewhat misleading tradition, let's call this type of proposition a counterfactual of creaturely freedom.
Molinists believe that the word 'freely' as it appears in counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom must be understood in some Libertarian sense, so
that a person's action is free only if it is not determined by prior events, the
laws of nature, or the activity of other agents. Now the Grounding
Objection claims that Molinism must be wrong because logically prior to
creation, there were no truths about what people would freely choose to do
if placed in certain situations. William L. Craig has argued recentlt that
the Grounding Objection is quite mistaken. By contrast, I think that the
Grounding Objection (or something in the neighborhood, perhaps something that the Grounding Objector could have said or should have said) is
much stronger than Craig thinks it is.
Professor Craig claims that liThe Molinist is under no obligation to provide warrant for [the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom], since he is merely proposing a model which is intended as one possible solution to the alleged antinomy of divine sovereignty
and human freedom" (Craig, p.339). But this seems wrong to me: true
Molinists claim not just that God's providence might involve knowledge of
true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, but rather that it actually does.
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(True Molinists include Molina, of course, and Craig himself, as far as I can
tell from his other writings.) There may also be "Modal Molinists" out
there (that is, persons who regard Molinism as just one possible picture of
the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom), but the
true Molinists are the ones making a positive assertion here, so they have
the initial burden of proof concerning the assumption that there are true
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
To his credit, Craig does say three things (pp.338-9) in defense of this
assumption (even though he does not feel obligated, as a Molinist, to do
so). But they are not very convincing. First, I disagree with Craig's claim
that "we ourselves often appear to know such true counterfactuals" (338),
and his claim that they play an indispensable role in our rational conduct
and planning (338). Instead, to repeat a well-worn point in this debate,
what we really know is what people will probably do, not what they will
freely do, and this is what plays an indispensable role in our rational conduct and planning. In fact, we are probably never in a position to say with
much confidence that any particular action is free (in the Libertarian sense
employed by Craig and the Molinists). This is because for all we know,
actions that seem to be free might very well have hidden causes. 2
Second, Craig says that the Law of Excluded Middle is plausible for
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (338). But since this argument
assumes that there is a fact of the matter concerning what an agent would
freely do if placed in some circumstances C, I think that it comes too close
to begging the question to be useful in this context.
Third, Craig claims that the Bible is full of counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom (338). In response, I don't think that this is at all clear, since the
Bible never explicitly says that we are free in a Libertarian sense (and the
counterfactuals of freedom that interest the Molinist are all about
Libertarian freedom). The scriptures never seem to address this issue
directly, and some authors have argued persuasively that one could interpret many passages in terms of a compatibilist account of freedom. 3 Craig
suggests without much argument that if we do not possess Libertarian
freedom, then God is the author of sin (339), but people have also argued
that Molinism makes God the author of sin,4 and there seems to be no hope
of resolving that disagreement in a non-question-begging way.
Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that other Molinists have tried to
provide warrant for the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of
freedom. Alvin Plantinga, for example, suggests that if we know that
Curley freely accepted a bribe of $35,000, then we have good reason to
think that Curley would have freely accepted a bribe of $36,0005 • Of
course, the counterfactual of creaturely freedom concerning Curley and the
larger bribe seems plausible to us only given that we know that Curley
accepted the smaller bribe. Hence the Grounding Objector will not find
this example plausible, because the situation is not parallel to the situation
that obtained logically prior to creation, when Curley did not exist and
hence had not accepted any bribes.
But even if Craig is right in thinking that there are now some true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, this does not necessarily answer the
Grounding Objection. The crucial claim that the Grounding Objector
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needs to hold on to is that there were no true counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom logically prior to creation. At the beginning and the end of his
paper, Craig quotes Alvin Plantinga's reply to the Grounding Objection:
"It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at
least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be
grounded in this way" (337, 348). Craig says that no anti-Molinist has yet
responded to this simple retort to the Grounding Objection. Well, 1 am not
an anti-Molinist (in fact, I'm inclined to be a Molinist myself, making this
commentary an instance of "friendly fire"), but I am happy to respond to
Plantinga on behalf of the Grounding Objector. His simple retort poses the
problem incorrectly. First of all, the current truth of some counterfactuals
of freedom is not sufficient for Molinism; instead, Molinists need to assume
that a large number of counterfactuals of freedom were true logically prior
to creation. Second, the Grounding Objector need not claim that all true
propositions are grounded in a certain way.
To make this point more clear, let's consider Craig's criticism of the idea
that all true propositions must be caused to be true by concrete objects.
Clearly Craig is right that this idea is mistaken. (He provides several counterexamples in his paper on p.34l.) But the Grounding Objector need not
claim that all truths are grounded in a certain way, just that certain truths
must be. In particular, the Grounding Objector needs to insist on something like the following principle:
GO: The truth of a true proposition concerning a specific human person must be explained in terms of the actual situation of the person in
question.
None of Craig's examples is a counterexample to this principle. (There
may be counterexamples out there, but my point is just that this is the
direction in which the Grounding Objector is clearly pointing.)
Craig's suggestion that the causal terminology often used to state the
Grounding Objection is actually just a rhetorical flourish seems quite right
to me (340). The real issue behind the Grounding Objection is not really
causation per se, but explanation. The big question is this: logically prior to
creation, what explains why a given true counterfactual of creaturely freedom is true, and what explains why a given false counterfactual of creaturely freedom is false?
In response to this question, which seems to me to be the essence of the
Grounding Objection, Craig offers nothing very promising for the Molinist
to say. He does suggest that the truth-makers for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom might be the corresponding states of affairs disclosed by the
disquotation principle (Craig, p.18), so that (for example) "If I were rich, 1
would buy a Mercedes" is made true by the "counterfact" that if I were rich,
1 would buy a Mercedes. (I like the term "counterfact", by the way.) But this
is not really a satisfying explanation. Facts (or obtaining states of affairs, as
Craig uses this term) are themselves abstract entities. As Plantinga points
out, it is customary to regard contingent states of affairs (or facts) as obtaining in virtue of some arrangement of concrete objects. ("Obtaining or actuality for states of affairs is like truth for propositions. The proposition [(3) G.
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Cantor is a mathematician] is true; had thillgs been appropriately different, it
would have been false"6.) So the truth of a contingent proposition concerning a specific human person (or the obtaining of a state of affairs involving a
specific human person) is customarily to be explained in terms of the actual
situation of the specific human person in question. In sum, it is unsatisfying
to explain the truth of the proposition in terms of the obtaining of the state of
affairs, since the obtaining of such states of affairs seems itself to require
grounding (and if it does not, then its obtaining will be just as mysterious to
the Grounding Objector as the ungrounded truth of a counterfactual of freedom). Finally, since the Grounding Objector will no doubt deny the
(ungrounded) obtaining of the relevant counterfacts (and reasonably so), this
style of explanation is also dialectially ineffective.
Craig's appeal to counterfacts confirms the suspicion that Molinists
must simply accept the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to creation as a brute, unexplained fact. There seems to be no
dialectically effective way to answer the Grounding Objection, so perhaps
the Molinist should simply reply that there is no explanation at all for these
truths. Craig suggests that the demand for an explanation here essentially
denies the existence of Libertarian freedom, but I'm not sure about that.
Libertarians need not be committed to the truth of counterfactuals of freedom logically prior to creation. (And in any case, the Grounding Objector
need not accept Libertarian freedom.)
If Molinists claim that there is no explanation for the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom prior to creation, is that bad for them? Not necessarily. It depends on what you want from a theory of providence, really.
The costs and benefits of Molinism must be considered carefully, from different points of view. In the end, it may be the case that Molinism is worth
the price of admission, brute facts and essences and all. (That is my own
suspicion, for the record.) Even Robert Adams, perhaps the most prominent of the Grounding Objectors, concedes in one place that his arguments
do not amount to refutations of Molinism and that he himself simply cannot understand how counterfactuals of freedom could be true without
some explanation of their truth7 • So maybe Molinists are able to conceive
of somethillg that Grounding Objectors are not. In any case, I still disagree
with Craig's overall negative assessment of the Grounding Objection
because I think that it raises a good question based on a plausible view
concerning the explanation of contingent truths about specific human persons. (Or at least that's the direction in which the Grounding Objector is
pointing.) So although I myself think that Molinism is probably the best
game in town, I also think that the Grounding Objection gives nonMolinists a plausible reason to playa different game instead.

Morehead State University
NOTES
1. "Middle Knowledge, Truth Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection"', Faith
and Philosophy volume 18, number 3, July 2001, pp.337-52; page numbers in
what follows refer to Craig's paper.
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2. This is an old point in the debate about free will. One person who makes it
very dearly is Daniel Dennett. See his book Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free
Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), pp.l35-6.
3. For example, see Donald A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom
(Atlanta, Georgia: John Knox Press, 1981).
4. For example, see William Basker's God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1989).
5. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974),
pp.174-80, especially p.177.
6. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p.47 (his emphasis).
7. See Robert Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil" in The
Virtue of Faith and Other Essays (Oxford, 1987), pp.82, 93.

